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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920601-CA 
v. 
JEFF SCOTT, a/k/a 
JEFFERY C. SCOTT, s Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Jeff Scott, a/k/a Jeffery C. Scott, appeals 
his conviction for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, -412(1)(b)(i) (1990), entered 
pursuant to a jury verdict in the First Judicial District Court, 
in and for Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable Clint S. 
Judkins, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
For reasons set forth in the body of this brief, the 
State answers the issues presented by defendant, but leads with 
an alternative ground for affirmance of the trial court's denial 
of his motion to suppress evidence. So framed, the issues are: 
1. Can this Court Affirm the Trial Court's Denial of 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, on the Alternative 
Ground that the Inventory Search of the Automobile in Which 
Defendant was a Passenger was Constitutionally Proper? The 
advisability of affirming a trial court's ruling on a proper 
alternative ground is, by nature, considered de novo on appeal. 
On the merits, to prevail on this issue, the State must persuade 
this Court that the trial court erroneously ruled that the 
inventory search was improper. While the standard of review is 
open to question, the State will demonstrate error even under the 
deferential, "clear error" standard of review. C£. State v. 
Hvqh, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985) (describing inventory search 
validity as a "finding," suggesting deferential review). 
2. Did the Trial Court Correctly Deny Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence, Seized Pursuant to the Inventory 
Search, on the Basis that Defendant, as a Passenger, Had No 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Searched Area of the 
Automobile? Because the underlying facts are largely undisputed, 
this question, often referred to as one of "standing," can be 
approached as a matter of law, according no particular deference 
to the trial court. See United States v. Padilla, U.S. , 
113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (per curiam), and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978) (both treating this question as 
one of federal law). 
3. Was Defendant's Conviction for Theft, Entered Upon 
a Jury Verdict, Supported by Sufficient Evidence, such that the 
Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion to 
Arrest Judgment? (Consolidating issues 2 and 3 in Br. of 
Appellant.) Appellate review of a jury verdict is highly 
deferential: "so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences 
support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them." State v. 
2 
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). See also State v. 
Workman, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993) (motions to arrest 
judgment under Utah R. Crim. P. 23, asserting evidentiary 
insufficiency, also entail high deference to jury). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are 
practically identical in their language. The former provision 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Any other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent 
to the resolution of the issue on appeal will be set forth in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As set forth by defendant (Br. of Appellant at 3-5), 
this appeal arises from a conviction for theft of money. 
Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence was denied, as 
was his post-trial motion, founded on a claim of evidentiary 
insufficiency, to arrest judgment on the jury's guilty verdict. 
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He appeals, asserting that these rulings (reproduced in the 
appendix to this brief) were erroneous.1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence supporting defendant's guilt is recited in 
the light favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Workman, 212 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993). The facts supporting the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress are recited in 
detail. State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1057 (Utah App. 1992). 
Money Theft in Brigham City 
At about 11:00 a.m. on February 13, 1992, employee 
Shari Oiler carried 428 dollars cash into Drewes Floral Shop in 
Brigham City, Utah. The cash, withdrawn from the First Security 
Bank branch in Brigham City, was to be used in the course of the 
store's busy, Valentine's Day Eve business (R. 729-30, 732-33, 
976). 
The store manager directed Ms. Oiler to lock the cash 
in a desk drawer, in the store's office (R. 730, 736). As she 
headed toward the office, Ms. Oiler encountered defendant's 
companion, Reynolds, near a store display. Still holding the 
cash, in a money bag so "stuffed" it cdfuld not be closed, she 
answered Reynolds's inquiry about flowers (R. 735, 737, 740-41). 
As she proceeded to the office, which was not used as a flower 
display area, defendant emerged from it (R. 736-37, 739). 
Defendant inquired about a job application; after locking the 
*The main record is R. 1-210; transcripts are sequentially 
paginated R. 211-1080. Parenthetical record and transcript 
references in this brief are therefore all designated "R." 
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cash in the desk drawer, Ms. Oiler helped find an application for 
him (R. 740-41). 
The store manager also noticed defendant and Reynolds 
(R. 857, 862-63).2 According to the manager, both men received 
job applications (R. 861-62). The pair then spent another ten to 
twenty minutes in the store (R. 743-44, 865). Apparently during 
this time, a third store employee answered Reynolds's inquiries 
about flowers, but did not see defendant. While assisting 
Reynolds, who made no purchase, this employee could not see into 
the store office (R. 881-84). 
At about 2:00 p.m., Ms. Oiler re-entered the office. 
She discovered that the desk drawer had been forced open, and the 
cash was missing (R. 745-46). 
Money Recovery in Salt Lake City 
Several hours after they were observed in Drewes Floral 
Shop, police officers detained defendant and Reynolds near a 
thrift store at 3606 South State Street in Salt Lake City, where 
a purse snatching incident had been reported (R. 455, 756-57, 
775-76). The victim identified Reynolds as the culprit, but was 
not deemed sufficiently certain about defendant's possible 
involvement. Therefore, Reynolds was arrested, and defendant was 
allowed to leave (R. 455-57, 776-77, 785). 
Before leaving, defendant told the officers that he and 
Reynolds had driven to the thrift store in a Lincoln automobile, 
20n appeal, defendant does not contest the store employees' 
identification of him and Reynolds as the persons they encountered 
in the store during the events in question (Br. of Appellant at 3). 
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driven by Reynolds and parked nearby (R. 457-58). The vehicle 
was owned by Reynolds's father or grandfather. The officers 
tried to contact the owner, but were unsuccessful (R. 481-82).3 
Defendant had no driver's license; thereby unauthorized to drive 
the Lincoln away, he departed on foot (R. 458, 762). The 
officers impounded the Lincoln (R. 458). Obtaining its keys from 
Reynolds, they performed an inventory search (R. 460-61, 766). 
In the Lincoln's locked glovebox, the officers 
discovered about 376 dollars in cash, including some rolled coins 
(R. 460-61, 760-61, 770, 957-58). A bundle of one-dollar bills 
among this cash was bound with a paper band that, in turn, bore 
printed identification from the Brigham City branch of First 
Security Bank (R. 461-62, 762, 811). Reynolds first claimed that 
the cash belonged to his grandfather. He then changed his story 
and told the officers that he had won it in a craps game (R. 794, 
816-17). 
It does not appear that defendant was asked about the 
money at the time of Reynolds's arrest (R. 815). Nor does the 
record reflect that he ever asked permission to retrieve any 
personal property from the Lincoln, although he had apparently 
left some audiotapes and a tape player in the vehicle (R. 482). 
The identification band on the cash prompted contact 
between Salt Lake and Brigham City police (R. 825-26). The 
3It appears that the Lincoln's owner lived in Brigham City (R. 
786), about fifty miles away from the site of Reynolds's arrest. 
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ensuing investigation led to defendant's arrest; he and Reynolds 
were jointly charged with the Drewes Floral Shop theft (R. 2-3). 
Motion to Suppress and Trial 
The trial court granted Reynolds's motion to suppress 
the cash seized from the Lincoln's glovebox, ruling that the 
vehicle had been improperly impounded, and therefore, the cash 
improperly seized during the ensuing inventory search. This 
ruling turned on the trial court's belief that impoundment of the 
Lincoln required some "nexus," found to be lacking, between the 
vehicle and the purse snatching incident for which Reynolds was 
arrested (R. 510). The court also ruled that defendant had not 
shown that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
Lincoln or, more precisely, the Lincoln's glovebox. Therefore, 
the suppression order did not extend to defendant (R. 507-11). 
Defendant's trial was severed from the proceedings 
involving Reynolds. At trial, the wrapping of the bills and 
coins found in Reynolds's Lincoln was shown to resemble that of 
the cash issued to Shari Oiler by the Brigham City First Security 
Bank on the morning of the Drewes Floral Shop theft (R. 957-58, 
976-83). Presented with this and the circumstantial evidence 
already recited, the jury found defendant guilty of the theft (R. 
170). His motion to arrest judgment was denied, and he was 
sentenced to a term of zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison (R. 178-80). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court need not reach defendant's state 
constitution-based argument for expansive "standing" to invoke 
the exclusionary rule against improperly seized evidence. 
Instead, this Court can affirm the denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress on the alternative ground that the challenged 
automobile inventory search was proper; the trial court's ruling 
to the contrary was erroneous. That ruling turned on the court's 
legally incorrect view that some connection between Reynolds's 
Lincoln and the offense for which Reynolds was arrested was 
required in order to impound the vehicle. No such connection is 
needed. Proper analysis looks to the police need to properly 
caretake a motor vehicle when no other responsible person is 
available to do so. That analysis was satisfied here, and the 
Lincoln was properly impounded. 
Under settled fourth amendment lawf the trial court 
correctly held that defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the Lincoln's glovebox. Although placed on notice to 
do so, defendant failed to provide any evidence, beyond his 
status as a passenger in the vehicle, to show that he had any 
expectation of privacy in it or in its glovebox. Defendant's 
argument for expanded "standing" to assert search and seizure 
violations under the Utah Constitution also fails. He does not 
show that fourth amendment standing limitations are flawed, a 
necessary predicate to departure from federal search and seizure 
law. The federal limitations balance the truth-subverting costs 
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(i f the exclusionary rule against its deterrent heneljt, That 
b a l a n c e uui jhl i I hi* II i ', 1 in IK M1 nuili i il I mi ihiln M \nv t i f ul i in 
The evidence adequately supported the trial verdict , 
No unusual riroumstanrpR, such as "physical impossibility," 
eoropeJ I h i s nu I In itji«t njh I In \-\ H J P I I U III • irpa'ii indli l e 
inferences gleaned from that ev i fienee amply support the jiiry's 
frnillnq ,>t qui 11 K,p • "| piement of theft, taMnq into account 
I.hf accomplice liability inst i ut t n in qu>nii In I I in iiiiiii1) imilil II1 
found to exisl beyond a reasonable doubt, and not merely as a 
i I irniiniln pnRs i Ii i I i I in,1 Thf name analysis was correctly 
appj . ed by the trial court, leading to its proper denial nil 
defendant's post-trial motion tn arrest jmlgmpnt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE VEHICLE IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS A. 
PASSENGER WAS PROPERLY IMPOUNDED; ON THIS 
ALTERNATIVE BASIS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDAN -
MOTION TO SUPPRESS CAN BE AFFIRMED, 
A This court May Prudently Avoid the Sweepii ig 
Constitutional Issue Posed by Defendant. 
Af- a par t of h i s I L is t p u m t mi a p p e a l , de iendcu i l un j nh 
t h i s Court ( under a r t i c l e 1, nectiorf 14 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
tn ilppart f i mi the federal t u l e ol l i m i t e d "s tand ing" 1 
rI <j I lenge seai their arvl s e i z u r e s , and expand the c l a s s ol persons 
hilliii may invoke the e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e , See Rakas v . I l l i n o i s , 4 19 
U '•! 1?R, c»"l " i l l I ' l l I II " I ' l l I M I M I C |iaFf"pnqcni -" in l i i i tomoM II f 
M in I t i no possessory i n t e r e s t in it ui i t s c o n t e n t s , lacked 
s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t a l l e g e d i l l e g a l search t h e r e o f ) . Under the 
rule he proposes, defendant, like Reynolds, would be entitled to 
suppression of the cash seized from the Lincoln's glovebox, under 
the trial court's ruling that the Lincoln was unconstitutionally 
impounded and inventoried• 
Defendant's proposed rule would constitute a dramatic 
break from settled federal law. States can make such departures 
under their own constitutions. E.g., California v. Greenwood, 
486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1630 (1988); State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion). However, 
such departures burden law enforcement, defense attorneys, 
prosecutors, and courts with the necessity of learning new search 
and seizure law, parallel to yet substantively different from 
federal principles. That burden ought not be lightly imposed. 
The prudent course is for a court to avoid making 
sweeping new constitutional rules if it need not do so in order 
to decide the case before it. See State v. Thurman, 203 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1993). That course is available here, for 
an appellate court can affirm a trial court's ruling on any 
proper ground, even one not identified by the trial court. State 
v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985); State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769, 782 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991). Such a course is available even if it entails reversal of 
a ruling actually made by the trial court. Wallis v. Thomas, 632 
P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981); accord Soldal v. Cook County, U.S. 
__, 113 S. Ct. 538, 543 n.6 (1992). 
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prov ide clear guidance for similar future cases. 
B Under the Relevant Circumstances, the Vehicle was 
Properly Impounded. 
It is unclear whether ti i.aJ court rulings on the 
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268 I lit rih ] Ml- "i |i i| rii.'Si i i I i m | in III i in I i in | ni ni I i in I i i \ , 
s u g g e s t i n g d e f e r e n t i a l r e v i e w ) , wjilli S t a t e v . S t i 11 IL 11 rirr • R11 
P,?d 979 , 98b (Utah Apr» I M M J » ( s i n t i n q I hrtl t h i s [ a p p e l l a t e ] 
- Mjit i I'II ill t-1 jui i Hi- i-ioprit-L'i I i iiipi •iiihlidit in I ( s u g g e s t i n g 
i i i i r jndeferential r e v i e w ) In t h i s c a s e , t h e t r i a l c c : r t f= - u l i n g 
lli ml R e y n o l d s ' s L i n c o l n was i m p r o p e r l y impounded fa ~ • under 
fin i J e a r e r r o r " s t a n d a r d , b e c a u s e tha i r u l i n g was . .. >w » 
IM c i f i c , i n c o r r e c t v iew of t h e law, See S t a t e v . Walkei 
IP 'til | ri |
 p | i| | | in ah Till | | I Il ,i nun I I ,ii-tiin I I mil 
c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s if a g a i n s t t h e c l e a i w e i g h t of th e v . c m k e cr 
" i n d u c e d by an e r r o n e o u s view of t lie law ) . 
TtiP f i i «i 1 ci in i l (i «q ifi i f 11"1 
of de f endan t ' s a s s e r t i o n tha i Hume k i n d of " n e x u s " be tween 
R e y n o l d s ' s L i n c o l n - a c t u a l l y owned by hxu f a t h e r ox g r a n d f a t h e r , 
IIIHII I In fill i « i i 11111 i III i in in I I i i mi in l 111 I, i' I i i i Hi liny in i I i It- i, i m d L i - : *• " 
" > M lequired in order In justify the Lincoln's impoundment By 
"nexus," the trial court evidently meant that the vehicle had to 
be used in furtherance of the purse snatching (R. 510, copied in 
appendix to this brief). The Lincoln was not so used. 
But no such "nexus" is required. Defendant advanced no 
legal support for his "nexus" argument (R. 471), and no such 
support can be gleaned from case law. In Hvah, Utah's leading 
automobile impoundment case, the Utah Supreme Court mentioned no 
"nexus" requirement. Instead, an impoundment need only be 
"reasonable," that is, either authorized by statute or necessary, 
"under the circumstances surrounding the initial stop," to 
protect the vehicle and its contents, 711 P.2d at 268. The 
impoundment and ensuing inventory search must also be conducted 
pursuant to standardized police policy. .Id. Accord Strickling, 
844 P.2d at 985-86. 
In this case, the trial court found that police 
impounded Reynolds's Lincoln pursuant to standardized policy. 
The policy provided for impoundment "[w]hen the person driving or 
in control of such vehicle is arrested" (R. 495; acknowledged by 
trial court at R. 509-10)/ The trial court also found that the 
failure of the impounding officers tp include the name of the 
off-scene, impoundment-authorizing officer on their "impound 
^Although the written impound policy in issue here has not 
been transmitted to the State with the record on appeal, it was 
admitted as an exhibit at the hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress, along with the "impound report" and a listing of the 
items found during the inventory search (R. 464-66). The quoted 
portions in this brief were read aloud during the hearing on the 
motion to suppress. 
12 
repo v i IAI".' i ! P r h n I c a ) er r o r f h a 1 d i 11 11 n t defeat t h e 1 eg i 11 ma cy 
nf the i n v e n t o r y search i| I Mill) These t i n d m g s w e i e pi opei 
The trial cuurt further found that no other 
('inirdiiqemerif • (ni safekeeping I I hi' 1 i ncoin and its contents were 
.reasonably available. That I. indiny was proper under the Ludl 
court's observation that the arrestee Reynolds, in charge of the 
v e i l I i 11. „ rI.Iimi II i II mi I i I- MI ,ii imiimIn II | i i i i f i i n q e 1 111 i I i MI HI e II III'1 M l 1 ' I H I . 
Defendant, although rml arrested, had run di; ivei s license and 
could not drive t tip Lincoln (R. 'I'ill| Further, the poliee had 
a I il e j up t e d 1 1 i I II II II in h i it i l n r i i "11 i i i i II i"iiiit- HI , i i i n l I in lull M M I I • * J I 1 IIIM) 
a n s w e r (R. 4hl-8?]i T h i s met their p o l i c y requirement, M m I ' | J |n 
c a s e s nf d r i v e r arrest id nut i P S villi Attempt to locate a 
r e s ] i u i i & i b l e p a r L ' ) win , din d B b u i i i f M J B I M I J J I I I m '.'eliiiin 1 e \' i I I i i 11 MI 
rea i "hie period of time, with the permission ot the OWTIIH I or 
drivei (u , 477-78) ' See Hvah, 'Ml p . 2 d a t 2 6 4 (approvi q 
similai .iiiipmiiid puIJcy provision) „ Thus, as required by Hvah and 
Stricklinq, the Lincoln's i ni] mundment was reasonable undc-t 1 he 
c L if rums tanrv-' , CU-PII though nnl *-»K]ilii i I I1, iriii I llii'n M M il by i Inliitc, 
DIn the trial cour t, defendant 
given custody of the Lincoln (R. 478). ~;>w .x^al court properly 
disregarded this argument which, if accepted, would defeat the 
caretaking and police liability considerations that underpin the 
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement, outlined in 
Hvcrh, 711 P. 2d at 287. Unable to reach the actual owner— 
Reynolds's father or grandfather, the police would have invited 
liability for property damage or loss, had they released the 
vehicle to defendant, Mr. Reynolds, Senior, could have been 
justifiably displeased to learn that his vehicle had been turned 
over, by police and without his permission, to defendant, a non-
family member, unlicensed to drive. 
II 3 
The trial court went awry by engrafting a "nexus" rule 
on to the foregoing, settled impoundment and inventory search 
principles. Such a rule would effectively require that whenever 
an automobile driver is arrested, police must leave the vehicle 
wherever it is stopped or found, even when nobody else can be 
located to take charge of it, unless the vehicle is an 
instrumentality of the crime that prompted the arrest. This 
undercuts the caretaking and liability-avoidance functions that 
automobile impoundment and inventory rules are intended to 
permit, under Hyqh, 711 P.2d at 267, as a matter of both state 
and federal constitutional law. If anything, those functions are 
especially important in a case such as this one, where the 
vehicle in question belongs not to the driver, but to an absent 
owner who cannot be contacted to reclaim it. 
Therefore, the "nexus" rule, advanced by defendant in 
the trial court, is both legally unsupported and ill-advised. 
Because the trial court erroneously adopted that rule, it 
committed clear error in ruling that the Lincoln was unreasonably 
impounded. Under the correct legal standards, the Lincoln was 
reasonably impounded, properly inventoried pursuant to the 
impoundment, and the cash was properly seized from its glovebox. 
This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's 
ruling that the cash was suppressible under federal or state 
constitutional exclusionary rules. Such reversal cannot change 
the outcome (whatever it was) of Reynolds's prosecution for the 
Drewes Floral Shop theft, because the State did not appeal from 
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the suppression ruling granted in Reynolds's fav or, 1 t does, 
howe v en :
 t pro\ ' i de a sc 3 :i :1 a 31 ternati ve grom ind for denyi ng the 
si lppr essioi i motion advanced by this defei idant. 
POINT TWO 
D E F E N D A N T H A D N Q R E A S 0 N A B L E E X p E C T A T I 0 N 0 E 
PRIVACY, BASED SOLELY ON HIS PASSENGER 
STATUS, IN THE SEARCHED .AREAS OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE, 
A Defendant had No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Under the Fourth Amendment. 
Fourth amendment " hinding," that Is, the extent of 
mi i *i iHrfi 1 .1 y-def i ned "reasonable expectations of privacy," ii an 
I b b U J I 1 I 1 h U l l ! I M i l l I »H I H i . l l ' 1 d II I  II I  II II II I h i i l l t " . l i t 1 I I I I 11 I 1 II L»tr I 1 y 
t o a l t e r . Rakas v . I l l i n o i s , 439 ll.K J,»8, 1 1 8 - 4 0 , 99 S, C t . 
4 ? 1
 f 4 28 - ? cl C I 91 R ) • C a l i f o r n i a v . Greenwood, 4 86 IT, c 3c; 4 I I I) fl 
I il II.. Ill Ml I I »•! I' P li ( " R e s p o n d e n t ' s argument i s in lit .n I Inni 
A s u g g e s t i o n tha t c o n c e p t s of p r i v a c y under t h e laws of e a c h 
H t f i f P i l l l > II I i t - s t P l ' l l l li TM ' I I I I ' 1MI ' 111 III I I 1 llH 1" I 11l I !' t III iI'MlllPIII l l l l l M l l Wf I II 
n o t a c c e p t t h u s s u b m i s s i o n " ) ; S t a t e v . S c h l o s s e r , 4 1 2\l li L , 
1138 (Utah 1989) Ilnlfir fhr f o u r t h amendment d e f e n d a n t had no 
leaiii rii'jbJe i-h||Hji trill LI II I I ) i i inn \ in I i^n I iL . 1 in NIIIII mil 
p a r t i c u l a r l y j t in i l h locked g l o v e b u x , 
R a k a s , t h e Supreme Cour t he] nil Ihiiil, p a s s e n g e r s i n a 
searchtntj v c-;n i \. J V , 'win» n I.a i mt-:-uI in » piisstjssi 11 y i in L e i e s I i n I In • 
v e h i c l e o r In I t ems k e p t in it. Lacked s t a n d i n g t o compla in t h a t 
I t e m s k e p t b e n e a t h t h e veh ic le ' s " . Rf,it an-1 .in i t s q lovebox worn 
i m p r o p e r l y faeizeiJ iiindln' i II e loui'Lh amendmenl '-li "I1!' 11,,1.! i "I I 4 II -
*-""'. 99 S. Cf , at: 4,13, The Court observed that just as a rasual 
. • ' 1 5 . • • • 
house guest cannot claim a personal privacy expectation in the 
host's entire home, neither can a mere passenger claim a personal 
privacy interest in the under-seat and glovebox areas of an 
automobile. 439 U.S. at 142, 143-44, 99 S. Ct. at 430, 433. 
Because defendant's claim of an expectation of privacy 
turns upon nothing more than his status as Reynolds's passenger, 
his standing to assert a fourth amendment violation in the search 
of the Lincoln's glovebox fails under the controlling law set 
forth in Rakas. Even if that search was unconstitutional, then, 
the cash seized from the glovebox was admissible into evidence 
against defendant. 
On appeal, defendant attempts to circumvent Rakas by 
raising the "possibility" that he had a possessory interest in 
the seized cash. The act of leaving his tape player in the 
vehicle's passenger compartment, he asserts, is also "some 
evidence" of his expectation of privacy. Without asserting that 
he asked Reynolds to lock the Lincoln and its glovebox, defendant 
urges this Court to find a privacy expectation, held by him, 
because "many passengers in vehicles" do make such requests (Br. 
of Appellant at 8-9). 
Defendant's attempts to prove fourth amendment standing 
on appeal should be summarily rejected. His standing was 
squarely challenged by the State in the trial court (R. 88, 470). 
At that point, defendant was obliged to establish his standing, 
through proof of supporting facts. State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 
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1056, 1057-58 (Utah App. 1992), 6 He put nn no such proof, and 
cannot now, upon mere "possibilities," ask this Court to iind the 
in illlij ;i I I ; a c t s I i J i h i H I . 
Defendant complains t h a t he war u n f a i r l y d isadvantaged 
because ir • 11 111 i In prove h is expec ta t ion of p r i v a c y , he may 
III! live been o b J i q e d to i. I ti i m a p o s s e s s o r y . i n t e r e s t in I hi HI J zed! 
o iiJiilli. Such o b l i g a t i o n , lie c o m p l a i n s , p u i s him in t h e u n t e n a b l e 
p'OS in I™ i o n Il in i i i | i II in I ml I | MI hii in l 1 iiinniiii t l l i i i l In ' i t u h I In" i I P I I l l l l ' i . o f 
Appellant at I H i However, the of I ense ol ttielLr toi whirh 
defendant was charged and convicted, contains no "possession" 
e l.emen 'I IH i " ' L •• M 1 i " I ' ' • » " h J "OI , > I " J ' | ,| 
property, Utah Code A m :i § 76-6-404 (1990) ( jury instructions a t 
I'll1, I  "i 11 "I 5 3 ) . Further, under the a ] ternati ve accomplice 
could be found guilty c f theft even had he never personally 
"controlled I he cash Utah Code Aim. i} /b-2- 20? (1990). 
Whole unexplained possession oil n-o, inLIy oLoluii 
property ir | i i iiia facie evidence" that the possessor is the 
I I  HUM I 11 r i d e i III ill ( ' m i l F n " ' I , if, U P 1 | I  " l' nil I | , il i i n 1 r o u r t " r a n n o t 
6The "reasonable expectatioi i of pri vacy" analysis, derived 
from,. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), actually has two parts. First, 
the proponent must prove that he or she actually subjectively 
expected that the searched area was private as to him,, or her 
Second, the proponent must prove that the expectation was 
legitimate in the view of society. 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 
516 (Harlan, J., concurring). As to the first part, defendant not 
only failed to allege a subjective privacy expectation, his actions 
actually belied such expectation: when released following 
Reynolds's arrest, he did not tarry to claim any items in the 
Lincoln,, but literally ran from the scene (K , 762), Rakas disposes 
of the second part of the Katz ana lysis. 
so instruct the jury. State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah 
1987). The jury was not so instructed in this case; nor was 
defendant's own possession of the cash particularly important, 
given that defendant need only have acted as Reynolds's 
accomplice in the theft. Therefore, for purposes of proving that 
he had an expectation of privacy against the glovebox search, 
defendant could have asserted a possessory interest in the cash 
contained therein, without unduly compromising his defense to the 
theft charge. His failure to do so defeats his "standing" 
argument under the fourth amendment. 
B. Defendant Makes No Persuasive Case for Expanding 
his Privacy Expectations under Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Having failed to carry his burden to prove fourth 
amendment standing, defendant asks this Court to substantially 
lighten that burden, under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The rule he proposes would confer standing, to 
challenge searches, upon persons who are no more than passengers 
in searched automobiles. Thus defendant's mere "legitimate 
presence" in Reynolds's Lincoln, he argues, gave him, no less 
than Reynolds, a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
improper police intrusion into the vehicle. 
Defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in the trial 
court, arguing for expanded search and seizure standing along the 
foregoing lines, under article I, section 14 (R. 113-18). Though 
filed after his motion to suppress had been denied, the trial 
court received defendant's memorandum and rejected his arguments 
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c n their merits (R, 7 04 in Accordinglyr his state constitutional 
11 n
 r=)| »pH I I H I * review• 
On appeal, however, ilh I i-ndant advances his argument in 
on] y cursory, conclusory fashion. In but three paragraphs (Br. 
• ::: i : A p p e ] 1 an i'l n I I Hi II, II | , II .i III' 1 III m i i I II 11 i i i l ' i \\\\ II I 
"legitimate presence" view ot standing espoused by the dissenters 
in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156-69, lV) S Ct . „ill 4*1. »-44 (I97H| WhM*., 
I f c:i i s s e n 1. i 11 j, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * i il 11',' fc \ 1 1 • 111111 m i , H a i fa 1111 i mi i m 11 m ;i i H \ * e j 11 , i i i » 
l)i Ipiidant does unl l;uief h i s s t a t e r o n s t i t u t i o n r j l 
a rgument in t h e manner p r e s c r i b e d in S t a t e y,, Bobo, 803 P 2d 
12 6 fc-l „ J,1-"- "i, (Utah App. I'l'M Hi.-' iluf1 i unl d i g u e tha i il lie-
Rakas maioi ' i t v r a l e ot l i m i t e d f e d e r a l s e a r c h and s e i z u r e 
" s t and.i nq " i " i n a p p r o p i i a l P in inrwi i r k a b I c , iinull r i t e s n o s c h o l a r l y 
c r i t i c i s m (J 1 l lu f e d e r a l r u l e , Illliiiiinlei: S t a t e v . T h o m p s o n , BJU 
P . 2 d 4 1 5 , 417 LH ( U t a h m i ) , and S t a t e v . L a r o c c o , 794 F 2d 4MI, 
4 6 6 - I' '" «*" "» , , " , n ! . 1 | j .1 i •• ."id! V M >•- f^p^a^< « 
be the key requirement for the development ot more expansive 
state constitutional search and seizure rules by Utah courts. 
T i l l 1 I ' i > u i L II in i: i \f t. I" i e i e i u 1 1 > d J S I . e \ \ t i \ \ I i I i.»I e 11 d • 1111 
expansive, state constitution-based "standing" argument on 
iiippcil, foi nark nl adequate brief inq HI-J State v, Yates, 834 
I ' * i II ' i '•) ILii , (-111 I 11 in II II i A | E 1! 9 9 2 In 11 II i-1 1 i 111111 j 1.11 „ \ \ i d r e s & m a d e q u a t e 
appellate argument under Utah K A pp. P ,M (a j ( 9 ) , and n t i i lg 
"'The Rakas majority's rule is now firmly established. See 
United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (per curiam 
opinion overruling, without dissent, the Ninth Circuit Federal 
Court of Appeals's "coconspirator exception" 3 the Rakas limited 
"standing" ru le). 
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supporting precedent); accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (approving principle that appealing party may not 
"dump the burden of argument and research" in the appellate 
court). The issue can simply await another day. 
If this Court does consider defendant's state 
constitutional argument on its merits, it should reject it. The 
Rakas dissent, relied upon by defendant, was directly rebutted in 
the majority opinion. 439 U.S. at 144-48, 99 S. Ct. at 431-33 
(rejecting "legitimate presence" theory as "a phrase which at 
most has superficial clarity and which conceals beneath that thin 
veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in 
any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment"). 
Besides overruling the "legitimate presence" theory 
suggested in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725 
(1960), and now advanced by defendant to support his argument 
under the Utah Constitution (Br. of Appellant at 10), the Rakas 
majority also distinguished that case. The defendant in Jones 
was not only "legitimately present" in the searched place, an 
apartment: he had been given the apartment keys, kept some 
clothing there, and, at the time of the challenged search, was 
occupying it alone, in the lessee's absence. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 
141, 99 S. Ct. at 429• In this case, defendant had no similarly 
full access to or control over Reynolds's Lincoln: his argument 
for "standing" to contest the vehicle's search is therefore very 
weak, compared to that of the defendant-petitioner in Jones. 
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Besides having been rejected in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134-
35, 99 S. Ct. at 426, the "target" theory also advanced by 
defendant would not help him. Defendant was not the "target" of 
the inventory search of Reynolds's Lincoln. Although detained at 
the purse snatching scene with Reynolds, defendant was released 
when the officers concluded that they did not have probable cause 
to arrest him (R. 789-90). The discovery of the cash, even if 
made before defendant left the scene, did not prompt officers to 
detain him further.8 Only later did he again become an 
investigatory target, when the identification markings on the 
cash led officers to the floral shop theft in Brigham City. 
Finally, the Rakas majority identified valid policy 
reasons for limited standing to assert search and seizure 
violations. The Rakas limit strikes a balance between the 
exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring police misconduct, and 
the societal goals of truthseeking and deterring crime. 439 U.S. 
at 137, 99 S. Ct. at 427; accord 439 U.S. at 152 & n.l, 99 S. Ct. 
at 435 & n.l (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J.). 
It does this by limiting the class of persons who may invoke the 
exclusionary rule, to those who cleaftrly persuade reviewing courts 
that their own reasonable expectations of privacy, not those of 
others, were violated by the police. 
Particularly in a state like Utah, that originally 
opposed the exclusionary rule in any prosecution, see State v. 
8It appears that the cash was not discovered until after 
defendant left, for he was apparently not questioned about the cash 
(R. 793). 
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Aime, 62 Utah 476, 484-85, 220 P. 704, 708 (1923), the Rakas 
balance ought not be disturbed under the state constitution. As 
a matter of policy, those who wish to invoke the exclusionary 
rule, and avoid prosecution for reasons wholly independent of 
their guilt or innocence, can properly be required to show more 
than mere "legitimate presence" in a searched area. In this 
case, defendant made no such showing, and therefore cannot claim 
the truth-subverting exclusionary rule remedy for his benefit. 
POINT THREE 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF THEFT. 
In his second and third points on appeal, defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft 
conviction. This Court and the trial court, considering 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment that raised the same 
challenge, both review jury verdicts with great deference: "[W]e 
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury." State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
In State v. Workman, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993), 
the Utah Supreme Court elaborated on the foregoing standard of 
review, in the context of a motion to arrest judgment. Given 
some supporting evidence, the reviewing court asks 
whether the inferences that can be drawn from that 
evidence have a reasonable basis in logic and 
reasonable human experience sufficient to prove 
each legal element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally 
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valid if it is based solely on inferences that 
give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt. 
212 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. Reaching this explanation, the court 
also approved a statement that a conviction may be set aside if 
the supporting evidence is "clearly contrary to some immutable 
law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict with one or more 
established and uncontroverted physical facts." .Id. (quoting 
Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983)). 
Defendant has forthrightly marshalled most of the 
evidence that supports his conviction (Br. of Appellant at 3-4, 
12-13), as required in State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 
App. 1990). He admits his presence, with Reynolds, in Drewes 
Floral Shop in Brigham City. He admits his and Reynolds's 
ability to see the cash, carried by Ms. Oiler into the store 
office. He admits that he was in that office, moments before 
encountering Ms. Oiler. Defendant admits that he and Reynolds 
remained in the store for some time after speaking to Ms. Oiler, 
and that at some point during this time, he was not seen, while 
Reynolds spoke to an employee in the display area. 
Defendant also admits his presence near the Salt Lake 
City thrift store, still in Reynolds's company, several hours 
after the pair was seen in Drewes Floral Shop: this was ample 
time to drive from Brigham City to Salt Lake City on Interstate 
Highway 15, a distance of fifty to sixty miles. The only 
noteworthy item missing from defendant's evidence recitation is 
the fact that the purse snatching victim in the thrift store 
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observed both Reynolds and defendant in or near the thrift store 
at about the moment of that crime. While identifying Reynolds as 
the purse snatcher, the victim told investigating officers that 
defendant appeared to be acting as Reynolds's lookout (R. 784-85, 
elicited on defense cross examination). Finally, defendant 
admits that the cash found in Reynolds's Lincoln "appear[ed] to 
be the stolen money" from Drewes Floral.9 
This circumstantial evidence provided the necessary 
"reasonable basis in logic" for the jury's guilty verdict. From 
it, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant and Reynolds 
were acting cooperatively in Drewes Floral, one "covering" for 
the other, who entered the store office, inferentially not an 
area frequented by customers, in order to seek—eventually 
successfully—something to steal. That inference was bolstered 
by later observations, at a Salt Lake City crime scene, of 
defendant and Reynolds behaving in evidently similar, cooperative 
fashion. See State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16-17 (Utah 
App. 1993) (other acts, under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), are relevant 
to prove intent, preparation, plan to commit charged crime). 
Reynolds's possession of c€ish, resembling that stolen 
from Drewes Floral, at the scene of the later Salt Lake City 
crime, completed the evidentiary picture upon which the jury 
could reasonably infer that defendant was guilty of theft. 
Again, it was not necessary for defendant to ever personally 
9This is a proper admission, given Reynolds's inconsistent 
account to police, heard by the trial jury, about how he had come 
into possession of the cash (R. 794, 816-17). 
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possess that money, so long as he could be found to have 
intentionally aided Reynolds in stealing it, under the accomplice 
liability theory, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) (R. 123, 154). 
The evidence permitted the jury to rule out the 
possibility that defendant's presence, with Reynolds, at the two 
crime scenes, was mere coincidence, and to find, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that defendant intentionally participated in 
the Drewes Floral Shop theft. Under the terminology of Workman, 
none of the evidence "hopelessly conflicts" with "immutable" 
physical laws or, for that matter, with other evidence presented 
at trial. It supports a likelihood of guilt that is not "remote 
or speculative," but realistic. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly rejected 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment, against his claim of 
evidentiary insufficiency. This Court should affirm that ruling, 
and, with it, the jury's guilty verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon properly received, competent, sufficient evidence, 
defendant was found guilty of theft. Accordingly, his conviction 
for that crime should be affirmed. * 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 2 ~ day of June, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX 
Trial Court Rulings on Motion to Suppress Evidence 
and 
Motion to Arrest Judgment 
I MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
1 reiterate what I said earlier. I don't know that 
2 there's anything new on that point. 
3 THE COURT: In ruling on this, gentlemen, I find 
4 this to be a rather interesting case and interesting 
5 in a couple of different ways. 
6 First of all, I'll address the standing 
7 issue. The facts before this court are that defendant 
8 Scott was a passenger in the vehicle; that he arrived 
9 at the location of where the vehicle was impounded as 
10 a passenger; and that he left certain items of 
11 personal property in the vehicle. I think that in and 
12 of itselff and it is the defendant's burden to show 
13 that he has standing, is not sufficient to shoulder 
14 that burden and I find that this defendant does not 
15 have standing to raise the issue. 
16 The reason for that is, I think, to 
17 clarify it, this court needs to know his circumstances 
18 I as a passenger. If he was a hitchhiker going down the 
19 road and the driver of the vehicle got out and advised 
20 him that, okay, I'll see you later and he left those 
21 things inadvertantly in the vehicle, that might be one 
22 thing. If he was a passenger who had traveled a great 
23 distance with the driver, if they had a mutual 
24 agreement as to where they were going and under what 
25 circumstances, that would give rise to facts that 
would give standing. But because of the facts before 
this court, I find that defendant Scott does not have 
standing * 
Now, as relates to the search pertaining 
to defendant Reynolds, I think Mr. Bunderson is 
correct when he indicates that this is a search and 
seizure, not a question of policy. The policy is an 
integral part of that, but this court must determine 
whether or not the supression of the evidence in this 
particular case is justified because of constitutional 
guarantees. Fourth Amendment guarantees. From the 
facts stipulated to in this case, and of course the 
court can make a finding of fact in this case because 
those facts are stipulated, this court finds that that 
was an inventory search pursuant to an impoundment. 
Then the question of the policy comes into 
effect and that policy must be reasonable. This court 
wouldn't -- in other words, because it is a policy it 
doesn't give rise to the same type of credence which a 
statute or an ordinance would give rise to. 
Nevertheless, the court, in examining the policy, 
finds that the policy, although vague in certain 
areas, the policy is reasonable. 
Now, let's address the particular 
arguments Mr. Molgard made. I find that there are 
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1 I certain reasons why it has supervisory approval. 
2 I Those reasons are evident. I feel, on why a supervisor 
3 must approve this. However, when the supervisor has 
4 given certain police officers blanket approval to 
5 impound under certain circumstances, I feel that that 
6 is in compliance with the policy. The reason for that 
7 is that the supervisor may know those individuals who 
8 he's given that blanket authority to and knows their 
9 capability, their competency, and so he allows them to 
10 do that. I find that the technicality of not putting 
11 the supervisor's name on the report is just that, a 
12 technicality, and wouldn't strike it for that reason. 
13 However, the policy of an inventory search 
14 has to be examined very closely because of its ability 
15 to circumvent Fourth Amendment guarantees. As I 
16 examine the policies here, I think, again, they're 
17 reasonable. The two which apply are the policies that 
18 when the person or persons in charge of such vehicle 
19 are unable to provide for its custody or removal, or 
20 when the person driving or in control of such vehicle 
21 is arrested for an alleged offense for which the 
22 officer is required by law to take the person arrested 
23 before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. 
24 Now, what these policies seem to 
25 I contemplate to this court is that when a person 
driving or in control cannot find somebody to provide 
for the custody or removal of that vehicle under 
reasonable circumstances, then possibly that could 
take effect. But I have extreme trouble with the, for 
lack of a better term, and I'm not sure that this 
falls within the case law on this, but I like Mr. 
Oliver's term nexus, the lack of nexus between the 
offense and the vehicle in this case. There has to be 
a reasonable basis to impound that vehicle. It can't 
be used as a sham to get to the items which are in the 
vehicle. If there had been any report in this case, 
from the facts and circumstances, that that vehicle 
was involved in this, I think the nexus would have 
been arrived at. 
Mr. Molgard raised the example of a 
shoflifter in a store, do they go out and impound his 
vehicle as being ludicrous. Yet the facts and 
circumstances of this case are very similar to that. 
The alleged offense was in the store and the vehicle 
was out in the parking lot. Because of that, this 
court finds no nexus, and I'll use that term, I 
suppose, Mr. Oliver, I like it so I'll use it, I find 
no nexus between the offense and the vehicle and 
therefore would order that those items in the glove 
box be suppressed as relates to defendant Reynolds. 
Because defendant Scott has no standing, that order 
2 I does not apply to him. 
3 Gentlemen, with that, it does appear to b 
4 an appropriate time to take a lunch break. I'm not 
5 sure, in view of the court's ruling on that particula 
6 issue, what can be — as far as defendant Reynolds is 
7 concerned, how he would be involved in further 
8 hearings on the additional motions that have been 
9 made. 
10 Let's reconvene at -- can we make that 
11 1:30, a 45 minute lunch, or do you want to go to two 
12 o'clock on lunch? 
13 MR. BUNDERSON: Whatever is a appropriate, Your 
14 Honor. Whatever you are comfortable with. I can do 
15 it in 45 minutes. 
16 MR. OLIVER: I guess Mr. Molgard is going to be 
17 leaving, but for my own -- if I have any input, I'd 
18 like it as short as possible. If we could continue 
19 through, I have no problem, but I have no problem in 
20 talking a lunch. 
21 THE COURT: Well, my support staff likes to eat 
22 occasionally. Let's go to 1:30. We'll reconvene at 
23 1:30. 
24 
25 (Lunch recess.) 
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1 affected Mr. Scott's right, or Mr. Scott's ability, to 
2 have a fair and impartial trial, based upon the fact 
3 that then the jury begins to look at me and discredit 
4 my arguments and discredit my presentation of the 
5 evidence, be it on cross-examination or direct, based 
6 upon the fact that Mr. Bunderson has now attacked me 
7 personally and emphasized two cases wherein I was 
8 looking at something that I was either not going to 
9 pursue or could not pursue. 
10 THE COURT: Counsel, as it relates to the two 
11 arguments that you've raised on misconduct of the 
12 prosecutor in this case, I'll rule that it is not 
13 properly before the court by way of motion. 
14 MR. OLIVER: I understand. 
15 THE COURT: I'll leave that open. I'm not going 
16 to rule on that. I will rule that it is not properly 
17 before the court now, so I won't accept your comments 
18 as argument. It should be submitted to the court in 
19 proper form and allow Mr. Bunderson an opportunity to 
20 respond• 
21 Let's limit the argument here today, prior 
22 to the sentencing/ to the motion to arrest the 
23 judgment as set before the court by way of pleading. 
24 Is there anything else that you have on that? 
25 MR. OLIVER: No, Your Honor. I would just go on 
1 further and indicate, and this is not the thrust, but 
2 indicate my contact with the juror, and I'll provide 
3 the court with the juror's name if I didn't in the 
4 motion. As a matter of fact, I've never called a 
5 juror in another case. This is the first time I've 
6 ever called a juror to find out what happened. I was 
7 really surprised when I spoke with this gentleman, and 
8 I don't recall his name but I have it in the file. He 
9 just indicated that it was based on coincidences. I 
10 think that that's quite profound. It's not -- I'm not 
11 attacking that, I'm only indicating to the court that 
12 that makes it an iffy situation. 
13 But I would also indicate to the court 
14 that thereafter, after the trial, I had a conversation 
15 with two police officers who sat through the entire 
16 trial, beginning to end, and they, prior to the jury 
17 verdict, felt that Mr. Scott was innocent. They were 
18 quite emphatic on that. 
19 I was thoroughly amazed at the jury 
20 verdict and I don't believe that there was evidence 
21 sufficient to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
22 Mr. Scott was involved in any criminal activity in 
23 Brigham City. Absolutely nothing was presented in 
24 that context. Being in Drewes Floral's office, if Mr. 
25 Bunderson felt so inclined, perhaps a burglary charge 
1 might be appropriate, but certainly there's no nexus 
2 to any theft and there was no evidence of any theft. 
3 I don't see it, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Bunderson. 
5 MR. BUNDERSON: I filed a response to this, Your 
6 Honor. I think the thrust of my response and the 
7 thrust of my argument here today would be that the 
8 defendant chose to try this to a jury. He doesn't 
9 J like the result, obviously. 
The court is not empowered to simply 
substitute your own judgment for that of the jury. I 
don't have a copy of the statute in front of me 
dealing with arrested judgments, but I think it would 
require something more than the court merely 
disagreeing with the jury. I'm not saying you do 
disagree with them, I don't know about that, but 
nonetheless you wouldn't be in a possession to simply 
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substitute your judgment for their's, so long as there 
was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could 
find a conviction, and clearly there was. There was 
ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could base 
a conviction. 
THE COURT: Rebuttal argument. 
MR. OLIVER: Briefly. I think Mr. Bunderson 
ought to read the rule. At any time prior to the 
1 imposition of sentence the court, upon its own 
2 initiative --
3 THE COURT: Tell me where the rule is. 
4 MR. OLIVER: Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
5 Criminal Procedure. 
6 THE COURT: Very well. 
7 MR. OLIVER: "At any time prior to the imposition 
8 of sentence the court, upon its own initiative, may, 
9 or upon the motion of defendant, arrest judgment if 
10 the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a 
11 public offense? or if the defendant is mentally ill," 
12 and we're not alleging that," or there is other good 
13 cause for the arrest of judgment. 
14 "Upon arresting judgment the court may, 
15 unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged 
16 is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a 
17 commitment until the defendant is charged anew or 
18 retried, or may enter any other order as may be just 
19 and proper under the circumstances." This is exactly 
20 an appropriate motion and the rules provide for the 
21 court to supply its own judgment in place of the jury. 
22 It's a very specific thing. It may be upon the 
23 court's own motion or upon the defendant's motion. 
24 I The situation is, Your Honor, as I've 
25 | indicated, and I'm not going to go through it again, I 
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just wanted to address the rule. The facts presented 
do not constitute a public offense. There was no 
evidence of theft. There was no -- there was evidence 
that something had happened. When and who we don't 
know. There was absolutely no evidence that Mr. Scott 
in any way, shape or form was connected with that. 
Even assuming the money found in Mr. 
Reynolds' car was that of Drewes Floral, Mr. Reynolds 
claimed ownership of it and the glove box was locked 
and Mr. Scott had no access to it. The money was also 
still intact. All of those factors indicate that 
there was no public offense committed and the evidence 
didn't constitute a public offense. 
We would ask this court to arrest the 
judgment and to indeed take appropriate action. We 
would ask for an acquittal, because I believe that's 
what the evidence presented shows. At minimum we'd 
ask for a new trial. Would afek for an acquittal and 
that's the primary thrust of our motion. 
THE COURT: Thank you. In ruling on your motion, 
Rule 23 does set forth that the court, upon its own 
motion or upon motion of the defendant, shall arrest 
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not 
constitute a public offense. In this particular case 
I feel the standard is whether or not there was 
1 sufficient evidence that was submitted or introduced 
2 that may lead the jury to determine that all of the 
3 elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, 
4 if there wasn't sufficient evidence that was 
5 submitted, then this court has to determine that and 
6 then the court would arrest judgment. 
7 In this particular case, the court finds 
8 that there was evidence submitted to support each of 
9 the elements. I'm not saying whether that is beyond a 
10 reasonable doubt or not. That's up to the jury. My 
11 job in determining this is as to whether or not there 
12 was evidence submitted which would support their 
13 verdict. I find that there was. Therefore, your 
14 motion to arrest judgment is denied, counsel. 
15 MR. OLIVER: May I just address that for one 
16 brief second? 
17 THE COURT: For what purpose? 
18 MR. OLIVER: Well, because I don't believe the 
19 rule anticipates --
20 THE COURT: If you have anything you want to 
21 place on the record for appeal you may do that, but 
22 I'm not going to argue with you. I've made my ruling. 
23 MR. OLIVER: I wouldn't argue with the court. 
24 THE COURT: Is th^re anything else that needs to 
25 be placed on the record for appeal? 
